{"id":14093,"date":"2025-09-09T09:02:51","date_gmt":"2025-09-09T09:02:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/?page_id=14093"},"modified":"2025-09-09T09:03:59","modified_gmt":"2025-09-09T09:03:59","slug":"14093-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/14093-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Santiago Echeverri"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Santiago Echeverri: Error possibilities and the ethics of belief<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tuesday October 14 2025 @11:30 (CET)<br><a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/maps\/place\/UNED+-+Humanidades\/@40.4366067,-3.7379162,17z\/data=!3m2!4b1!5s0xd4228238189d7b7:0x62044c79ae77dfac!4m6!3m5!1s0xd42295f507d8465:0xc8bff2c2c262c868!8m2!3d40.4366067!4d-3.7353359!16s%2Fg%2F11d_d4qny9?entry=ttu\">Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED<\/a>\u00a0&amp;\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/contact\/\">online<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Abstract<\/em><br>Most contemporary treatments of skepticism construe it as a paradoxical argument\u2014namely, a set of initially plausible propositions that lead to an absurd conclusion, such as:\u00a0We have no justification for believing in propositions about the external world. By focusing primarily on epistemic states, this approach has tended to overlook another historically significant aspect of skepticism: its role in the rational regulation of belief. In this talk, I\u00a0show that one can construe a skeptical paradox for the rational regulation of beliefs.\u00a0I begin with a commonsense intuition: that subjects are doxastically justified in dismissing radical error possibilities without needing to offer reasons in support of their doxastic attitudes. I then distinguish three strategies for explaining this intuition and show that each faces a significant challenge. If these challenges cannot be resolved, it follows that subjects are never rationally justified in dismissing radical skeptical hypotheses. I conclude by proposing a decision-theoretic response to this new form of skeptical paradox.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Bio<\/em><br><a href=\"https:\/\/www.secheverri.com\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Santiago Echeverri<\/a> es Investigador Titular A en el Instituto de Investigaciones Filos\u00f3ficas de la UNAM. Anteriormente, fue investigador en la Universidad de Ginebra (2011-2016) y la Universidad de Amberes (2019). De 2016 a 2019, fue\u00a0Visiting Scholar\u00a0en la Universidad de Rutgers y la Universidad de Nueva York. Sus investigaciones se enfocan en la epistemolog\u00eda, la filosof\u00eda de la mente y la filosof\u00eda de las ciencias cognitivas. En trabajos recientes, ha examinado las representaciones perceptuales de objetos, las paradojas esc\u00e9pticas, la estructura de la justificaci\u00f3n perceptual, la primera persona y la justificaci\u00f3n de las emociones. Ha publicado art\u00edculos sobre esas tem\u00e1ticas en revistas internacionaes como\u00a0<em>British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,\u00a0Journal of Philosophy,\u00a0Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,\u00a0Philosophical Studies<\/em>\u00a0y\u00a0<em>Philosophy of Science<\/em>. En la actualidad, es el director de la revista\u00a0<em>Cr\u00edtica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosof\u00eda<\/em>\u00a0y coordina el grupo de investigaci\u00f3n &#8220;Experiencia, Raz\u00f3n y Acci\u00f3n (ERA)&#8221;.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Santiago Echeverri: Error possibilities and the ethics of belief Tuesday October 14 2025 @11:30 (CET)Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED\u00a0&amp;\u00a0online AbstractMost contemporary treatments of skepticism construe it as a paradoxical argument\u2014namely, a set of initially plausible propositions that lead to an absurd conclusion, such as:\u00a0We have no justification for believing in propositions about the external [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7949,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-14093","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14093","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7949"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14093"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14093\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":14097,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14093\/revisions\/14097"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14093"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}