{"id":13475,"date":"2025-01-20T16:59:21","date_gmt":"2025-01-20T16:59:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/?page_id=13475"},"modified":"2025-04-02T09:33:31","modified_gmt":"2025-04-02T09:33:31","slug":"lilith-mace","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/seminar\/lilith-mace\/","title":{"rendered":"Lilith Mace"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Lilith Mace: Kinds of doubt<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tuesday April 22 2025 @11:30 (CET)<br><a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/maps\/place\/UNED+-+Humanidades\/@40.4366067,-3.7379162,17z\/data=!3m2!4b1!5s0xd4228238189d7b7:0x62044c79ae77dfac!4m6!3m5!1s0xd42295f507d8465:0xc8bff2c2c262c868!8m2!3d40.4366067!4d-3.7353359!16s%2Fg%2F11d_d4qny9?entry=ttu\">Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED<\/a>\u00a0&amp;\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/contact\/\">online<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Abstract<\/em><br>Our doubt talk is varied. We talk of <em>having doubts<\/em> that P, about <em>doubting that<\/em> P, and <em>being in doubt<\/em> with respect to P, to give a few examples. Some epistemologists have taken this variety in our \u2018doubt\u2019 talk to indicate a variety of doubt states. In this talk, I argue that this is a bad way of accruing ontological commitments in one\u2019s epistemological theorising. I\u2019ll propose a better one, which has to do with normative conflict between doxastic states. In short, we should be committed to as many distinct doxastic states as are required to explain genuine normative conflicts in one\u2019s doxastic profile. Linguistic data suggests that there is a normative conflict between <em>doubting that P<\/em> and <em>believing that P<\/em>, but not between <em>having doubts that P<\/em> and <em>believing that P<\/em>, which suggests two different doubt states. I\u2019ll consider some ways of accounting for this normative difference using extant theories of doubt, and find them wanting. I\u2019ll then propose my own theory of the nature of doubt, which accounts for this normative difference between having doubts and doubting that P, but manages to do so <em>without<\/em> positing multiple kinds of doubt. Rather, the difference in doubt that underpins this normative difference is argued to be a difference in <em>degrees<\/em> of one doubt-state, rather than a difference in <em>kind<\/em> between doubt-states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Bio<\/em><br><a href=\"https:\/\/www.lilithmace.com\/\">Lilith Mace<\/a> is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow on the ERC-funded project KnowledgeLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology, and a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Her current research focuses primarily on doubt. She also works on inquiry more broadly, and in particular on the attitudes that inquirers typically have during their inquiries, known as \u2018questioning attitudes\u2019 or \u2018interrogative attitudes\u2019 (e.g. curiosity, wonder).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Lilith Mace: Kinds of doubt Tuesday April 22 2025 @11:30 (CET)Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED\u00a0&amp;\u00a0online AbstractOur doubt talk is varied. We talk of having doubts that P, about doubting that P, and being in doubt with respect to P, to give a few examples. Some epistemologists have taken this variety in our \u2018doubt\u2019 talk [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7717,"featured_media":0,"parent":11563,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-13475","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/13475","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7717"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13475"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/13475\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":13893,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/13475\/revisions\/13893"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/11563"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13475"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}