{"id":12233,"date":"2023-09-18T16:23:45","date_gmt":"2023-09-18T16:23:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/?page_id=12233"},"modified":"2023-09-18T16:24:52","modified_gmt":"2023-09-18T16:24:52","slug":"12233-2","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/seminar\/12233-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Mitch Green"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>Mitchell Green: Can a robot perform a speech act?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Tuesday October 10 2023 @12:00 (CEST)<br><a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/maps\/place\/UNED+-+Humanidades\/@40.4366067,-3.7379162,17z\/data=!3m2!4b1!5s0xd4228238189d7b7:0x62044c79ae77dfac!4m6!3m5!1s0xd42295f507d8465:0xc8bff2c2c262c868!8m2!3d40.4366067!4d-3.7353359!16s%2Fg%2F11d_d4qny9?entry=ttu\">Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED<\/a> &amp; <a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/contact\/\" data-type=\"page\" data-id=\"11553\">online<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Abstract<\/em><br>Green and Michel, in \u2018What Might Machines Mean?\u2019 (Minds and Machines, vol. 32 (2022), pp. 323\u20138), argue that under certain conditions, artificially intelligent robots are able to perform speech acts in the traditional, semi-technical sense of \u2018speech act\u2019 traceable to Austin and Searle. In their, \u2018AI Assertion\u2019 (OSF Preprints, 2023), Butlin and Viebahn contend that Green and Michel\u2019s showcase examples do not meet the normative standards required to make assertions. In this talk I will recount Green and Michel\u2019s original argument, which stresses that the sorts of mental states and conceptual competence underpinning them required for the performance of many speech acts do not require consciousness. I then reply to Butlin\u2019s and Viebahn\u2019s challenge, showing that with a modest clarification of their position, Green and Michel can accommodate Butlin\u2019s and Viebahn\u2019s objection while maintaining their original contention of the possibility that artificially intelligent robots can illocute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Bio<\/em><br><a href=\"https:\/\/philosophy.uconn.edu\/person\/mitch-green\/\">Mitch Green<\/a> is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut, and Editor-in-Chief of Philosophia. His research concerns pragmatics, philosophy of language, aesthetics, and the philosophy of mind.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Mitchell Green: Can a robot perform a speech act? Tuesday October 10 2023 @12:00 (CEST)Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED &amp; online AbstractGreen and Michel, in \u2018What Might Machines Mean?\u2019 (Minds and Machines, vol. 32 (2022), pp. 323\u20138), argue that under certain conditions, artificially intelligent robots are able to perform speech acts in the traditional, [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7717,"featured_media":0,"parent":11563,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-12233","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/12233","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7717"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12233"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/12233\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12239,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/12233\/revisions\/12239"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/11563"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.uned.es\/metis\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12233"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}