Ignasi Gil: The Epistemic and Zetetic Irrationality of Incessant Checking in OCD

Tuesday June 16 2026 @11:30 (CET)
Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED & online

Abstract
Incessant checking in OCD can be practically irrational, as it only reduces anxiety temporarily and may interfere with daily goals. But what about its epistemic and zetetic irrationality—that is, its irrationality as believers and as inquirers? In this paper, I argue that incessant checking might be epistemically or zetetically irrational depending on the reasons that lead the OCD incessant re-checker to violate the Succes Norm of Inquiry, which states that: S ought not to inquire whether P? at t if, at t, it is not rational: either believe that, if S inquires whether P? at t,S will achieve the aim of its inquiry; or to suspend judgmentabout whether, if S inquiries whether P? at t, S will achieve the aim of its inquiry.

Bio
Ignasi Gil is a PhD candidate at the Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy at the Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), working as an FPI-funded researcher (2023–2027) in the project “The Nature and Normativity of Inquiry” (PID2021-123938NB-100). His research focuses on applying recent developments in epistemic and zetetic normativity to problems involving dubious inquiries, such as incessant checking, incessant checking in OCD, and skepticism.