Santiago Echeverri: Error possibilities and the ethics of belief

Tuesday October 14 2025 @11:30 (CET)
Sala B, Edificio de Humanidades, UNED & online

Abstract
Most contemporary treatments of skepticism construe it as a paradoxical argument—namely, a set of initially plausible propositions that lead to an absurd conclusion, such as: We have no justification for believing in propositions about the external world. By focusing primarily on epistemic states, this approach has tended to overlook another historically significant aspect of skepticism: its role in the rational regulation of belief. In this talk, I show that one can construe a skeptical paradox for the rational regulation of beliefs. I begin with a commonsense intuition: that subjects are doxastically justified in dismissing radical error possibilities without needing to offer reasons in support of their doxastic attitudes. I then distinguish three strategies for explaining this intuition and show that each faces a significant challenge. If these challenges cannot be resolved, it follows that subjects are never rationally justified in dismissing radical skeptical hypotheses. I conclude by proposing a decision-theoretic response to this new form of skeptical paradox.

Bio
Santiago Echeverri es Investigador Titular A en el Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la UNAM. Anteriormente, fue investigador en la Universidad de Ginebra (2011-2016) y la Universidad de Amberes (2019). De 2016 a 2019, fue Visiting Scholar en la Universidad de Rutgers y la Universidad de Nueva York. Sus investigaciones se enfocan en la epistemología, la filosofía de la mente y la filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas. En trabajos recientes, ha examinado las representaciones perceptuales de objetos, las paradojas escépticas, la estructura de la justificación perceptual, la primera persona y la justificación de las emociones. Ha publicado artículos sobre esas temáticas en revistas internacionaes como British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Journal of Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies y Philosophy of Science. En la actualidad, es el director de la revista Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía y coordina el grupo de investigación “Experiencia, Razón y Acción (ERA)”.