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# Urban environments favorable to radical narratives

## The case of El Puche

Manuel Moyano, Jocelyn J. Bélanger, Roberto M. Lobato  
& Humberto M. Trujillo

University of Córdoba | New York University Abu Dhabi | Marbella  
International University Centre | University of Granada

This paper aims to study the process of violent radicalization in El Puche, a marginal neighborhood of Spain with a high percentage of disenfranchised Muslims. Particularly, we explore whether this neighborhood exhibits the factors proposed by the 3N model of radicalization: needs, networks, and narratives. We present two studies in which we analyze these factors. In the first study, we compare needs and networks between Muslims ( $N=47$ ) and Christians ( $N=45$ ). In the second study, we analyze the interrelation of these factors in a sample of Muslims ( $N=111$ ). We found that people's association with radical networks mediates the relationship between the quest for significance and radical narratives. We conclude that need, network, and narrative are interconnected, and illustrate some of the dynamics that foster social exclusion and radicalization, leading to supporting violence in this type of urban environments.

**Keywords:** 3N model of Radicalization, relative deprivation, social network, narratives of terror, legitimization of terrorism, deprived context

### 1. Introduction

Most conceptual approaches agree that violent radicalization is a complex process involving a vast number of cognitions, emotions, and behaviors conducive to intergroup conflict and violence (McCauley and Moskalkenko 2017). It is also commonly asserted that supporting radical narratives may progress toward extremism and the commitment of terrorist acts, although not all radicalized individuals ultimately carry out violent actions (Doosje et al. 2016; McCauley and Moskalkenko 2008; Victoroff 2005). In the process of radicalization, factors like the social envi-

ronment can be decisive (Speckhard 2010). Thus, in the present paper we analyze the role of the environment in the acceptance of radical narratives. Specifically, we examine one deprived neighborhood in the southeast of Spain, El Puche, and present two studies with Christian and Muslim teenagers and study their political attitudes using the 3N model of radicalization.

### 1.1 The process of radicalization

One of the most promising perspectives on the process of radicalization is the 3N model of radicalization, developed by Kruglanski and collaborators (Kruglanski et al. 2009, 2013, 2018). This model explains the radicalization process by proposing that there are three contributing psychosocial factors, labeled as the “3Ns” (Webber and Kruglanski 2017): (1) individual needs, centered on the theoretical concept of the quest for significance; (2) ideological aspects (narratives); and (3) group dynamics (networks). According to this theoretical framework, when people’s personal significance is threatened or lost (need), they are likely to turn to groups (network) to restore it because group membership enables one to attain a sense of worth and belonging (Tajfel and Turner 1979). By joining a group, individuals become exposed to its ideology (narrative), so that the norms and values of comrades progressively permeate the person’s identity and serve as a moral compass (Bélanger et al. 2018). If the narrative glorifies violence, then individuals become at risk of engaging in violent behaviors. Overall, the theory predicts that one possible trajectory of radicalization leading to violence consists of individuals transitioning from wanting significance, to becoming part of a community of practice and, subsequently, to espousing violence as a means of furthering their ideology.

In support of this model, empirical evidence has shown that a loss of personal significance (e.g., a feeling of shame, humiliation, or dishonor) can make radical narratives more attractive (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015), promote self-sacrifice (Dugas et al. 2016), and lead to violent disinhibition (Lobato et al. 2018). This attractiveness is even stronger for those who feel more anomie (Adam-Troian et al. 2019; Bélanger et al. 2019), present a greater need for cognitive closure (Webber et al. 2017), or have high levels of sensation-seeking behavior (Schumpe et al. 2018). However, less evidence exists regarding the role of social network. In this vein, it is proposed that the network reinforces the radical narrative through group dynamics such as greater consensus (Mooijman et al. 2018), more restrictive social norms (Gelfand et al. 2013), or higher valuing of one’s social relationships (Lobato, Moya, and Trujillo 2020; Swann et al. 2009).

Regarding the environment, research by Jasko et al. (2019) suggests that radical contexts strengthen the link between collective significance quest and support

for political violence. In addition, Lobato et al. (2020) found that a vulnerable environment facilitates the legitimization of terrorism through significance quest and mosque attendance. This evidence suggests that the radicalization process develops inside a specific context. In this vein, Speckhard (2010) highlights that, when radicalization occurs in non-conflict zones, it depends on grievances and local context, and the role of charismatic recruiters becomes more important.

Therefore, it is clear that context and networks are essential elements in the process of radicalization and the acceptance of radical narratives. However, empirical evidence regarding the environmental factors related to the loss of significance is limited. It is for this reason that in the present research we set forth to examine the different characteristics that make an environment vulnerable.

## 1.2 Radicalization in urban environments

The lack of integration facilitates the formation of marginalized ghettos, some of which have become significant hotbeds of jihadist recruitment (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015; Soufan and Schoenfeld 2015). Drivers and processes of radicalization and recruitment are highly complex. So, even when vulnerable environments provide a significantly disproportionate number of jihadist recruits, there is a far more significant proportion of the population that does not radicalize (Fajmonová, Moskalenko, and McCauley 2017). Nevertheless, it is still essential to identify these locations and the characteristics that make them more subject to radicalization.

According to Soufan and Schoenfeld (2015), hotbeds of recruitment share, at least, two characteristics. The first is the existence of local grievances and individual problems. These grievances are related more to the specific problems in the town or neighborhood than to wide-ranging causes; for example, the prospect of finding in the specific location one's identity, purpose, and meaning. The latter is a motivation referred to as the quest for significance; that is, the need "to be important," "to be someone" and "to make a difference" (Kruglanski et al. 2009, 2014). The second aspect is the presence and influence of one or more charismatic figures committed to jihadism that prey on vulnerable individuals, which Kruglanski, Bélanger, and Gunaratna (2019) refer to as the network element of radicalization. Their presence and knowledge of the community, coupled with the peer-to-peer nature of their interactions with potential recruits, allows them to tailor their extremist narrative to address local grievances and thereby maximize recruiting effectiveness. Therefore, these characteristics fit with the factors proposed by the 3N model of radicalization, so they should facilitate the acceptance of radical narratives.

### 1.3 The case of El Puche

The neighborhood of El Puche is located in the city of Almería, in the south-east of Spain. This context, characterized by marginalization and social exclusion (Checa and Arjona 2005), strongly resembles other decaying European neighbourhoods or districts such as Molenbeek-Saint-Jean in Brussels (Van Vlierden 2016), Angered in Sweden (Ranstorp, Gustafsson, and Hyllengren 2015), or El Principe in Spain (De la Corte 2015, 2019). We hypothesize that El Puche can be regarded as a vulnerable environment that can facilitate radical narratives (Moyano and Trujillo 2014). We examined the context of this neighbourhood using the following six dimensions: (1) geographical and demographic dimensions, (2) policies and institutions, (3) economics, (4) socio-cultural background, (5) urban vs. rural life and welfare, and (6) criminality rate (De la Corte 2019).

#### 1.3.1 *Geographical and demographic dimensions*

El Puche extends over a 21-hectare area. It is geographically isolated, and the rest of the city of Almería is not easily accessible from El Puche. Given such factors, there exist several limitations which may preclude exterior influences on the population and restrict the contacts between its inhabitants and those of nearby neighborhoods (Checa and Arjona 2005, 2010).

It is difficult to determine the actual population due to the high mobility of the inhabitants. However, the last estimated population was 5,500 people (Ministerio de Fomento 2011a). According to this data, 51.35% were under 30 years, and around 65% were not officially registered. The last available data from 2011 indicates that 3,665 residents (66.04%) are foreigners, while 510 are children (9.19%) (Ministerio de Fomento 2011b). Most of these citizens are of Moroccan origin. Such an increase in a short period of time is reported to have provoked distrust among Almería residents, and has been conducive to prejudices and group discrimination, and frequently resulted in group discrimination, and frequently led to violent incidents (Arjona and Checa 2007).

#### 1.3.2 *Policies and institutions*

Although over the past years Almería's public administration has invested in remedial actions, the neighborhood remains one of the most disadvantaged and degraded in Spain (Pérez 2019). For several reasons, the neighborhood lacks sanitary conditions, local services, and leisure facilities. One of the main reasons is vandalism (Betanzos-Martín et al. 2018; Ortiz 2016). Another reason is that part of its inhabitants live in illegal housing do not pay rent or bills and, therefore, do not pay taxes (Da Silva 2018). Furthermore, the high unemployment rate and illegal activities increase the lack of public funds (Checa and Arjona 2005). Fur-

thermore, the isolated location of the neighborhood along with the perception of insecurity that it generates makes local investment risky. Nevertheless, in the last years, some institutions and facilities have been created such as schools, religious oratories, cultural centres, a health centre, a sports centre, green spaces, and functional public transport (Castillo and Miralles 2015; Tres Culturas, 2019).

### 1.3.3 *Economics*

Trade, agriculture, and the manufacturing industry are the main jobs carried out by residents of El Puche. However, most people do not have the opportunity to advance their career and get better paying positions (Checa and Arjona 2005). As a result, inhabitants of El Puche have little, if any, job security. Furthermore, a relevant percentage of residents perform illegal jobs such as petty crime, dogfights and cockfights, the sale of scrap metal, and drug trafficking (Checa and Arjona 2005; Pajarón 2019b). These illegal activities constitute a significant contribution to the residents' economy.

### 1.3.4 *Socio-cultural background*

El Puche is one of the Andalusian neighborhoods with the highest concentration of excluded immigrants, mostly Moroccans (Capote and Nieto 2017). It is a dynamic neighborhood with many displacements of inhabitants; a very young population (more than 50% are under 30 years) with a high rate of school dropouts, i.e., a majority of inhabitants cannot read or write (27.34% do not have any schooling whatsoever) (Ministerio de Fomento 2011a). The neighborhood is also described as low on civism and lack of concern for the common good (Checa and Arjona 2005; Da Silva 2018). Additionally, it is characterized by a high rate of dysfunctional families (Cervera and Núñez 2018).

### 1.3.5 *Urban vs. rural life and welfare*

Of the 2,125 existing houses in El Puche, many of them are in appalling conditions or are not inhabitable (32% of buildings are either dilapidated or in a deficient state) (Ministerio de Fomento 2011a). It is not unusual for flats in El Puche to be overcrowded with more than twenty immigrants living together; this has given rise to an illegal system of room rental, the so-called "warm bed" rental system in which multiple individuals share one room and pay per day. Among the petitions of the neighborhood's association are demands for improvements in public transportation, street lighting and cleaning, the inclusion of green spaces, and personal security (Da Silva 2018).

### 1.3.6 *Criminality rate*

Crime is one of the main problems in El Puche. Stealing electricity, selling drugs, working illegally, and the use of violence are common activities in this area. Families that have increased their income by selling drugs are less likely to engage in petty crime; however, the production of drugs is related to violent activities including robberies in drug plantation (e.g., marijuana) and illegal laboratories (Da Silva 2018; Pajarón 2019b, 2019a). Regarding jihadist activity, recently, the National Police arrested in another Almería neighborhood one of the most wanted Daesh foreign terrorist fighters along with two other individuals who accompanied him (Ministerio del Interior 2020).

## 1.4 The present research

As described above, El Puche closely resembles other vulnerable environments in Europe associated with radicalization. But whether El Puche generates greater support for radical narratives remains an empirical question. To answer this question, we explore whether the inhabitants of this neighborhood exhibit the factors proposed by the 3N model and, if so, how they are interrelated. Accordingly, we present two studies in which we analyze these factors in samples of young teenagers in El Puche. In the first study, we compare these factors between Christians and Muslims. In the second study, we present another sample of Muslim youth to analyze how these three variables are interconnected.

## 2. Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to measure how Christian and Muslim residents of El Puche psychologically differ in terms of their personal need for significance and social networks as a consequence of the environment. We hypothesize that (1) Christians and Muslims will present similar needs given that they share the same context, although (2) Muslims will feel sympathy for more radical social models than Christians due to the rise of jihadist terrorism.

### 2.1 Method

#### 2.1.1 *Participants*

The sample was composed of a total of 92 students (51 males, 55.43%; and 41 females, 44.57%) in the local high school of El Puche. The age of respondents ranged between 13 and 17 years old ( $M=14.70$ ,  $SD=1.12$ ). Regarding religion,

45 participants (48.91%) self-identified as Christians (19 women), while 47 (51.09%) as Muslims (22 women). In the Christians group, about half were Spanish non-gypsies and the remaining half-Spanish gypsies. In the Muslim group, all participants were born in Morocco, though they came to Spain at a very young age. They come from a diverse number of locations such as Marrakech, Beni Mellal, Errachidia, Meknes, Berkane, Taourirt, Nador, Larache, or Fez, to name a few; as a consequence, they have mostly been socialized or have been educated in two different societies: Spanish and Moroccan.

### 2.1.2 Instruments

**Relative deprivation:** the needs component was evaluated by measuring relative deprivation, that is, a discrepancy between one's group value expectations and their value capabilities (Gurr 1968), which is understood as a trigger of the significance quest. It was measured with two items validated and taken from Moyano (2011): "Muslims live in poorer neighborhoods than Christians do" and "Christians have better chances to get a job than Muslims." Both items were answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*Fully disagree*) to 5 (*Fully agree*). For Muslims the average of both items was calculated ( $r_{(47)} = .35, p = .016$ ), while for Christians the average of these items was calculated after reversing them ( $r_{(45)} = .39, p = .007$ ); higher scores indicate more relative deprivation for both Christians and Muslims.

**Sympathy for social models:** to evaluate the social network, we constructed a scale of sympathy for social models. This scale evaluates the social representations held by teenagers in El Puche concerning different social groups and models. It included a list of 21 items measured on 11-point Likert scales ranging from 0 (*Nothing*) to 11 (*A lot*) according to the participant's degree of sympathy with respect to the following groups, figures or institutions: (1) the police; (2) social workers; (3) the imam in my neighborhood's mosque; (4) the priest in my neighborhood's church; (5) the administration of the school; (6) the teachers at my school; (7) people who help out in poor countries; (8) people who fight for a fairer world; (9) Spanish soldiers on international missions; (10) your sports coach; (11) famous sports people; (12) people who fight and die for Islam; (13) famous artists; (14) the Spanish; (15) Moroccans; (16) Christians; (17) Jews; (18) Muslims; (19) gypsies; (20) the politicians in my city; and (21) Spanish politicians in general.

**Religiosity:** to evaluate the social network component, we evaluated if they described themselves as actively practicing their religion (*yes* or *no*) and the attendance to the place of worship, be it the church or the mosque. It was measured with a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*never*) to 7 (*several times every day*).



### 2.1.3 Procedure

The participants completed the questionnaire on a voluntary basis once the School Council approved the study, and a written informed consent was obtained from the participants' parents. Administering the questionnaire took about 40 minutes and was administered by two researchers who had been specifically trained to that end. The respondents responded to the questionnaires in their classrooms and the school's teachers provided support. We made sure that all the students understood the questionnaire.

## 2.2 Results

### 2.2.1 The quest for significance

We compared the scores of Muslims and Christians in relative deprivation using Student t-test for independent samples. Significant differences were found ( $t_{(90)} = 5.90$ ,  $p < .001$ ), particularly, Christians ( $M = 3.78$ ,  $SD = 1.22$ ) expressed greater relative deprivation than Muslims ( $M = 2.30$ ,  $SD = 1.18$ ).

### 2.2.2 The social network

We analyzed the social representations relating to different social groups and models. The results are shown in Table 1. Broadly, the social representations of each group were different and differed between Muslims and Christians.

As can be seen, the most valued social models by Muslims were "Muslims," "the people who fight and die for Islam," "the people who help out in poor countries," "Moroccans," and "the imam in my neighborhood's mosque." Also of interest are the low scores for "Spaniards," "Christians," "Jews," and "gypsies." These findings suggest animosity and prejudiced attitudes on part of these Muslims towards other social groups, which may predispose them to violent radicalization. Such social and cultural divide may be a sign of imminent radical and conflicting behaviors. Of note, "the people who fight and die for Islam" represents the second most important social model for Muslims. This too attests to the radical attitudes of Muslims in our sample, and their potential readiness to progress into violent extremism.

The Christians' most valued social models are "people who fight for a fairer world," "Spaniards," "the people who help out in poor countries," "gypsies," and "Christians." It seems as if the social models which are most valued by a group were the least valued by the other, attesting to polarized social identities.


Finally, we used the Ward method (Ward 1987) to obtain a hierarchical cluster of the social models preferred by Muslims and Christians. On the one hand, the most valued social models by Muslims is Islamic role models together with

**Table 1.** Mean differences of social models for Muslims and non-Muslims


	Muslims		Christians		<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Police	6.30	3.89	5.09	3.53	1.558	.123
Social workers	7.06	3.20	6.62	2.85	.698	.487
The imam in my neighborhood's mosque	8.21	2.93	2.40	2.98	9.439	.000
The priest in my neighborhood's church	3.74	3.75	5.44	3.48	2.251	.027
The administration of the school	7.85	2.92	7.82	2.69	.049	.961
The teachers at my school	7.98	2.89	7.40	2.93	.955	.342
The people who help out in poor countries	9.19	2.02	8.93	1.64	.671	.504
The people who fight for a fairer world	7.36	3.81	9.09	1.55	2.871	.006
Spanish soldiers in international missions	7.26	3.25	8.24	2.26	1.702	.092
The sports coach	7.64	2.71	5.93	3.44	2.634	.010
Famous sports people	6.45	2.97	7.76	2.92	2.132	.036
The people who fight and die for Islam	9.32	1.87	3.98	3.44	9.198	.000
Famous artists	5.15	3.41	7.71	2.79	3.957	.000
Spaniards	5.91	3.54	9.02	1.96	5.240	.000
Moroccans	9.11	1.46	3.89	3.33	9.652	.000
Christians	5.02	3.76	8.58	2.32	5.483	.000
Jews	3.68	3.69	4.67	3.22	1.367	.175
Muslims	9.40	1.17	3.29	3.21	12.035	.000
Gypsies	3.15	3.74	8.82	1.84	9.291	.000
The politicians in Almería	7.30	2.92	6.67	2.99	1.024	.308
Spanish politicians in general	7.87	2.75	6.82	3.16	1.704	.092

Note. *M* = Mean; *SD* = Standard Deviation.

people who help out in poor countries (see Figure 1). On the opposite side, we found a cluster where there are less valued social models that are Christians, Jews, Spaniards, gypsies, and priests. On the other hand, individuals providing help and fighting for a fairer world together with Spaniards, Christians, and gypsies formed the most valued cluster for Christians, while all Islamic related social models and Jews constitute the less valued cluster (Figure 2). On the whole, Muslims and Christians preferred those social models that share their cultural/ethnic identity while rejected social models that do not. Thus, these preferences for different social models reflect the polarization of social identities.



**Figure 1.** Hierarchical cluster by Ward method of the social models preferred by the Muslims' sample



**Figure 2.** Hierarchical cluster by Ward method of the social models preferred by the Christians' sample

In addition, regarding the questions related to religiosity, we examined whether participants practice their religion and the frequency of attendance at the place of worship. We found that all Muslims described themselves as actively practicing religion, while only 49.8% of Christians described themselves as such. In fact, Muslims ( $M=3.28$ ,  $SD=2.29$ ) attended the temple more frequently than non-Muslims ( $M=2.24$ ,  $SD=1.86$ ) ( $t_{(90)}=2.38$ ,  $p=.020$ ).

### 2.3 Discussion

Contrary to our first hypothesis, Christians perceived more relative deprivation than Muslims. However, as predicted, the Muslims' social networks were related to more negative aspects such as religious conservatism, social models related to religion and the use of violence in its defence; on the other hand, Christians' social networks focused on ethnic and national identities and those models that helped people in worse conditions. These findings show that Christians are more likely to perceive that Muslims are to blame for their situation, yet the social models they support indicate that they will find significance in helping others. In contrast, Muslims consider Christians to a lesser extent to be the guilty of their situation. Even so, the social models they follow encourage a stricter interpretation of religion and the use of violence in the pursuit of significance. Overall, it seems more likely that the relationship between the quest for significance and social networks will increase support of radical narratives by Muslim within this context.

## 3. Study 2

In light of the results in Study 1, the purpose of Study 2 was to test the tenets of the 3N model of radicalization by examining the relationship between need, network, and radical narratives. We hypothesized that three factors are interconnected as follows: the need for significance will lead to a close relation with the social network, which, in turn, will provide support for radical narratives. That is, the social network will mediate the relation between need and narrative.

### 3.1 Method

#### 3.1.1 Participants

The sample was composed of 111 Muslim students (55 males, 49.55%; and 56 females, 50.45%) in the local high school of El Puche. The age of respondents ranged between 13 and 17 years old ( $M=14.86$ ,  $SD=1.09$ ). As in the first sample, all

participants were born in Morocco, although they came to Spain at a very young age. Thus, they have mostly been socialized or have been educated in two different societies: Spanish and Moroccan.

### 3.1.2 Instruments

Relative deprivation: the need for significance was assessed through relative deprivation using the same two items as in Study 1. Scores on these items were correlated ( $r_{(109)} = .52, p < .001$ ) and were thus averaged.

Mosque attendance: the social network was assessed as the mosque attendance measured using a single item: "How often do you usually attend the mosque?" This item was measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*Never*) to 7 (*Several times a day*).

Radical narratives: the radical narratives were assessed with two different constructs. First, religious conservatism was measured using four items validated and taken from Moyano (2011) (e.g., "High schools should have praying rooms" and "People must defend their religion above everything: even if they have to die for it;"  $\alpha = .75$ ). Second, support for terrorist attacks in Spain was measured with the following item: "The 3/11 terrorist attacks in Madrid were fair and deserved." All items were measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*Fully disagree*) to 5 (*Fully agree*). Higher scores reflect greater adherence to radical narratives.

### 3.1.3 Procedure

The procedure was the same as in the first study. Again, the participants collaborated on a voluntary basis once the School Council approved the study, and a written informed consent was obtained from the participants' parents. The fulfillment of the questionnaire took about 20 minutes.

## 3.2 Results

Path analyses were conducted to investigate the influence of relative deprivation on (1) religious conservatism and (2) support for terrorism through mosque attendance. The model was tested with Amos (Arbuckle 2011) using maximum likelihood estimation procedures. We display means, standard deviations, and correlations for all measures in Table 2.

Results revealed that the hypothesized model fit the data well:  $\chi^2 (df = 2, N = 111) = .17, p = .91, GFI = .99, CFI = 1.00, IFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, AIC = 16.17$ . As shown in Figure 3, results indicated that relative deprivation was positively associated with mosque attendance ( $b = .40, SE = 0.16, t = 2.46, p = .01$ ), which in


**Table 2.** Means, standard deviations, and correlations involving all variables ( $N=111$ )

	2	3	4	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1. Relative deprivation	.22**	.01	.06	2.73	1.33
2. Mosque attendance		.20*	.21*	3.78	2.36
3. Religious conservatism			-.07	3.84	0.85
4. Support for terrorism				2.85	1.53

Note.

\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ;

turn was related to religious conservatism ( $b = .07, SE = 0.03, t = 2.15, p = .03$ ) and support for terrorism ( $b = .14, SE = 0.06, t = 2.34, p = .01$ ). Indirect effects were investigated to test the mediating role of mosque attendance between relative deprivation, religious conservatism, and support for terrorism. Consequently, bootstrapped confidence interval estimates of the indirect effect were calculated to confirm the significance of mediation (Preacher and Hayes 2008). In the present study, the 95% confidence interval of the indirect effects was obtained with 5,000 bootstraps resamples (Preacher and Hayes 2008). Results confirmed the hypothesized mediation between relative deprivation and religious conservatism ( $b = .04, SE = .02; 95\% CI = [.004, .11]$ ) and terrorism endorsement ( $b = .05, SE = .02; 95\% CI = [.006, .12]$ ).



**Figure 3.** Results from Path Analysis. For clarity, covariance paths and error terms are not shown

Note. \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

### 3.3 Discussion

As predicted, mosque attendance mediated the relationship between the perception of relative deprivation and religious conservatism and support for terrorism.

The findings of this study provided support for the 3N model of radicalization by demonstrating that needs, networks, and narratives are interconnected in a sample of youngster Muslims living in El Puche. In addition to providing support for our theoretical framework, the present findings illustrate some of the dynamics that foster social exclusion and support violent narratives.

#### 4. General discussion

The environment in which people live has a strong influence on their beliefs, emotions, and behaviors. Thus, marginalized neighborhoods increase individuals' support for radical narratives that promote violence for social change. In order to better understand these processes, we conducted two studies in a marginalized Spanish neighborhood, El Puche. In the first study, we unexpectedly found that Christians experienced more relative deprivation than Muslims. Muslims attended mosque more frequently and held more positive attitudes toward Islamic role models. In the second study, we found that the perception of an illegitimate inequality by Muslims (i.e., relative deprivation; need) leads to greater mosque attendance (network), which in turn is associated with religious conservatism and terrorism support (narrative).

According to these results, we propose that the social interaction between Christians and Muslims in this neighborhood is the main cause. Factors like isolation of the neighborhood, public abandonment, low income, high unemployment rate, precarious life situations, drug-dealing activities, and perceived insecurity could be accentuating perceptions of intergroup inequality and create a loss of, or a potential threat to, one's significance (Jasko, LaFree, and Kruglanski 2017). However, the fact that Christians perceive this to a greater extent seems to correspond with the Islamophobic views that blame Muslims for their situation. On the other hand, Muslims do not blame Christians, possibly because their reference out-group is different, or because they perceive that Christians have a similar situation. Another possibility is that, the fact being that Muslims are a majority, they do not think that Christians are a threat.

Regarding social networks, Christians rely on models that represent national and ethnic identities and individuals that contribute to creating a better world. In opposition, Muslims rely more on Islamic models and individuals that use violence, i.e., people who fight and die for Islam. This is obviously a risk indicator for radicalization. Given the principles of vicarious learning (Bandura 1977), youngsters could try to imitate these social models to gain status or a sense of excitement and adventure. In fact, there is evidence that the quest for significance leads to support for political violence through sensation seeking when there are no alter-

natives to violence (Schumpe et al. 2018). Thus, religious Islamist leaders who share jihadist ideology could provide violent means to young Muslims to gain the significance they are looking for. In this vein, our results also support that mosques can be used as a vector for radicalization that facilitates the spread of these radical narratives (Lobato et al. 2020; Stares and Yacoubian 2006).

Altogether, these results provide evidence for the role of social networks in the radicalization process. In addition to interventions geared toward improving the living conditions in this neighbourhood, prevention efforts should also encourage the participation of positive social role models that can rechannel individuals' significance quest in a positive, non-violent direction.

Accordingly, interventions should focus on the three factors studied and proposed by the 3N model. First, to reduce relative deprivation, increase integration with the rest of community should be encouraged and the living conditions of the neighborhood should be improved (e.g., Castillo García and Miralles Ortega 2011, 2015; Cervera Mata and Núñez Delgado 2018; González-Sanz and Feliu Torruella 2015; Mayor Paredes and López Medialdea 2017; Ortiz 2016). Second, it is necessary to promote non-violent narratives that encourage young people to contribute to the good of the community. In the same way, the initiatives should attenuate islamophobia and the neighborhood's negative reputation. Third, these narratives should come from relevant members of the community who can serve as role models. Joining efforts to meet the needs of young people through peaceful, participatory, and inclusive models should be a priority to change the future of marginalized neighborhoods.

In terms of theory our study provides additional evidence for the 3N model of radicalization. The living conditions in an urban context may create a loss of personal significance in many of its residents, which may be associated with a feeling of injustice derived from not having what they deserve. However, these needs do not support the acceptance of a radical narrative by themselves. The sympathy for Islamic role models and the assistance to the neighborhood's mosque are key factors in the relationship between needs and radical narratives. In other words, teenagers need a network supporting, validating, and facilitating the idea that they need to create a society within the host society itself by maintaining their identity (cultural and religious), and avoiding interactions with other cultural groups to get radicalized (Kruglanski et al. 2018). Therefore, it is the synergy of needs and network which facilitates the justification of violence and radical narratives in this vulnerable environment.

Notwithstanding, it is also necessary to highlight some of the study limitations. First, our findings were derived from small samples and thus should be interpreted with caution. Even when the results are in line with the literature, more studies in similar environments are needed to replicate and confirm our



conclusions. Second, the correlational nature of the data prevents us from making assertions about causality. Future studies should compare different environments in order to deepen our understanding of the effects they produce on the individuals. Third, it is necessary to mention that attendance to mosque indicates a greater relationship with the religious people who attend the mosque, but it is not an indicator that the sermons given at the mosque or the attendees are radicals.

In conclusion, critical environments characterized by marginalization with large Muslim communities can facilitate jihadist recruitment in two ways. First, these environments offer recruiters the possibility to hide their illicit activities and find people at risk (i.e., loss of significance) they can exploit. Second, people living in these environments develop extreme religious narratives that support terrorism, which is reinforced by mosque attendance and charismatic leaders. Hence, they have a predisposition to accept radical narratives that offer them a positive identity, so they are more vulnerable to violent radicalization. Thus, psychosocial interventions geared toward improving the living conditions in the neighborhood and providing prosocial ways of attaining personal significance are necessary to prevent radicalization leading to violence.

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## Address for correspondence


Roberto M. Lobato  
 Marbella International University Centre  
 Department of Psychology  
 Avenida Don Jaime de Mora y Aragón, s/n, Finca El Pinillo  
 29601, Marbella  
 Spain  
 romulobato@gmail.com

## Biographical notes

**Manuel Moyano** is professor of social psychology at the University of Córdoba (Spain). His research focuses on violent extremism, processes of radicalization, conflict, and psychosocial risks.

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6745-0936>

**Jocelyn J. Bélanger** is professor of social psychology at the New York University of Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates). His research focuses on political violence, self-sacrifice, and deradicalization.

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3881-0335>

**Roberto M. Lobato** is professor of social psychology at the Marbella International University Centre (Spain). His line of research focuses on the analysis of group attitudes among religious groups and different forms of collective political and cultural violence.

 <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4152-7020>

**Humberto M. Trujillo** is full professor of methodology for behavioural sciences at the University of Granada (Spain). His research is broadly concerned with indoctrination and recruitment in terrorist context and the relationships between criminality and political violence.

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